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I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the number of cases that have amassed during the
past biennium, this survey,' like the one preceding it, will attempt
a discussion of a relatively small number of cases pertaining to the
law of property. Well established principles of law, although still
viable, will for the most part be excluded, except where their reitera-
tion is valuable in obtaining a better understanding of the decisions
involved.





In the case of Industrial Supply Corp. v. Bricker,3 suit was
instituted to foreclose a mortgage. The mortgage had been executed
by a lender and an owner of realty who wished to build an apart-
ment complex. Contemporaneously, they entered into a loan agree-
ment whereby the mortgagee agreed to lend a certain sum to the
owner during the course of construction.
Prior to construction, the mortgage was recorded; however, the
construction loan agreement was never recorded. Construction was
begun upon the property, and appellants, a general contractor and
1. This survey covers volumes 285 through 310 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series,
and legislation in Fla. Laws 1974, and 1975.
2. FLA. STAT. § 711.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
3. 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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a supplier, perfected lien interests in the mortgaged property which
dated from the recording of the owner's notice of commencement.
Thereafter, the mortgagor failed to make payments under the note
and mortgage, thus supplying a basis for the mortgagee's suit. Ap-
pellants claimed priority over the mortgage to the extent that mon-
ies were not actually distributed prior to the filing of the notice of
commencement because of the alleged failure of the mortgage agree-
ment to give notice as to the fact that future advances were in-
tended. This was in violation of Florida Statutes section 697.04.1
At the outset, the District Court of Appeal, Second District
held that the mortgage, securing a construction loan, clearly fell
within the ambit of a mortgage for future advances and, as such,
the mortgagee was obligated to make the future advances.
The court held that since the appellants knew of the intention
of the parties that construction would be carried out on the mort-
gaged property and that advances to be secured by the mortgage
would likely be made during the course of construction, and since
the agreement stated that any construction loan agreement would
become a part of the mortgage, the mortgage complied with the
aforementioned statute by sufficiently giving notice that future ad-
vances were intended to be made.
The court noted that wisdom would have dictated specific ref-
erence to future advances, as well as identification of the construc-
tion loan agreement. However, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision, thus giving lien priority to all of the mortgagee's future
advances, including those made subsequent to the effective date of
the mechanics' liens by appellant.
B. Judicial Sales
Allstate Mortgage Corp. v. Strasser5 presented a question of
great public interest: Whether the 1971 amendment to Florida Stat-
utes section 45.031, which had changed the procedure for the sale
of property pursuant to court order, eliminated the right of redemp-
tion from foreclosure judgments after the date of the public sale and
before the sale is completed by a court order confirming the sale?
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a "sale" did not take
4. This section applies to the securing of future advances in mortgages. One of the
requirements is that the mortgage shall state that its purpose is to secure future advances.
5. 286 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1973).
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place until ownership of the property was transferred and that such
transfer does not take place until there is a court order confirming
the sale. Thus, the right of redemption from foreclosure judgment
continues until a court order, which will usually issue 10 days later,
confirms the public sale.
In Sens v. Slavia Inc. ,' the court allocated the right to a surplus
fund resulting from a mortgage foreclosure sale between the holder
of the equity of redemption at the time of the sale and certain
unsecured creditors who did not have a legally recognized lien sta-
tus. A surplus fund existed after the foreclosure sale of a mortgaged
hotel. The trustee-holder of the equity of redemption on the mort-
gaged hotel, at the time of its foreclosure sale, was held not to be
legally responsible for the unsecured claims of former tenants, who
had allegedly been constructively evicted by the mortgagor, and was
entitled to keep the surplus fund. The court held that the hotel
tenants' claims for damages were properly in contract against the
defaulting mortgagor and not against the foreclosed property or the
surplus fund which resulted from the sale.
C. Mortgage Brokers
1. JURISDICTION
In Heritage Corp. v. Apartment Investments, Inc.,' plaintiff
filed a complaint against a Kansas resident and a Florida resident
as co-partners and sole stockholders in a corporate defendant. Plain-
tiff alleged its right to a mortgage broker's commission for having
obtained a loan committment in Florida for the development of an
apartment complex in Kansas. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that where personal service was made on the Florida
resident, who was also the president of the corporation, and where
the action arose out of a business venture in Florida, sufficient mini-
mum contacts were alleged to vest jurisdiction in the Florida courts.
Also, based on the principle that service upon one partner is valid
as to other partners,' service upon the Florida resident was held
sufficient to bring the Kansas resident within Florida's jurisdiction.
6. 304 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1974).
7. 285 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).




In S & D Enterprises, Inc. v. Sonnenb lick-Goldman Southeast
Corp., plaintiff, a mortgage broker, brought an action to recover a
brokerage commission. The defendant, a prospective borrower, exe-
cuted an agreement with plaintiff providing that the broker would
procure for the defendant a conversion/construction loan
commitment for a specified sum. The broker was successful in ob-
taining from a lender a commitment offer which the defendant bor-
rower accepted and approved. Defendant borrower subsequently
refused to close the deal with the lender because the lender de-
manded additional security. The borrower later closed a similar deal
with another lending institution without paying a brokerage fee.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District held that once the
committment was procured, a sum was owed to the broker. Even
though the lender and the borrower in the instant case might not
be able to obtain specific performance on their lending agreement,
the broker would still be entitled to his commission because he had
been hired to find a lender rather than to close the deal. The court's
decision was analagous to the situation in which a broker is hired
to find a purchaser as opposed to effecting a sale of a house.
D. Option to Create a Mortgage
The issue of the vitality of an unexercised option to mortgage
created a problem of first impression in the Florida courts. By way
of analogy to an unexecuted option to renew a lease, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held in Feemster v. Schurkman"
that the option to create a mortgage creates a valid interest in the
form of an encumberance upon the real property involved. The court
also held that although there may be no debt in existence between
the time of the recording of the option agreement and the time of
the trial, the option agreement has vitality and effects a lien or
charge against the property superior in time and right to plaintiff's
later recorded mortgage.
E. Usury
Padgett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association" con-
9. 310 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
10. 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
11. 297 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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cerned an allegedly usurious contract which fell in an hiatus be-
tween the termination of a prior statute on usury"2 and the enact-
ment of a later statute' which was not retroactive. The mortgagor
brought suit against the mortgagee on a promissory note claiming
that the mortgagee had demanded and received usurious repayment
of principal and interest. The mortgagor was unable to recover both
the principal and the interest, as neither of the above mentioned
statutes were in force at the time. However, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, did allow recovery of the interest under a
third statute.'4 Allegations that the mortgagee wilfully received in-
terest in excess of 25 percent were, however, held not to constitute
a cause of action in tort for fraud, notwithstanding the contention
that the mortgagee fraudulently and wilfully intended to charge
excessive interest at the time of the signing of the note.
The appellee raised the question of whether it could, as a Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank, use as a defense the exemption afforded to
building and loan associations in Florida Statutes section 665.395.1
The court refused to rule on this issue, and said that it should have
been raised as a defense at trial.
III. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Offer and Acceptance
As a general rule of law, contracts are assignable unless assign-
ment is forbidden by the terms of the contract, or would violate
some rule of public policy or statute, or if reliance is shown upon
personal credit of a specific purchaser." In Kitsos v. Stanford,7
purchasers, at the time of their acceptance of the deposit receipt for
the sale of property, added the phrase "and/or assignees" after their
names on a deposit receipt. The seller contended that this change
constituted a new offer by the purchasers; therefore, the transaction
never passed beyond the negotiation stage. The District Court of
12. FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1967). Under this statute, a person could recover both the
principal and the interest under a usurious loan.
13. FLA. STAT. § 687.071 (1969). Here also, a person could recover both the interest and
the principal.
14. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1969).
15. This section states that "no fines, interest, or premiums paid on loans made by any
building and loan association shall be deemed usurious . . ."
16. Walton Land & Timber Co. v. Long, 135 Fla. 843, 185 So. 839 (1939).
17. 291 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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Appeal, Third District, held that the extra three words did not
change the legal meaning of the contract so as to constitute a new
offer; and therefore, the change did not render the purchasers' ac-
ceptance inoperative. Thus, the purchasers were entitled to the en-
forcement of the contract.
B. Notice
In O'Neal v. City of Coral Gables,"8 the United States of
America entered into a contract with a private individual for the
conveyance of a piece of property. Because the city was not given
an opportunity to acquire the parcel, which under federal law it
had a right to do, the contract between the private party and the
United States was declared a nullity. The United States govern-
ment then deeded the property to the city.
The individual brought an action for specific performance of
the contract between himself and the United States against the city,
contending that the city was not a bona fide purchaser without
notice. The court held that notice refers only to valid contracts and
that therefore there was no cause of action for specific performance.
Plaintiff's remedy, if any, would have to lie in an action against the
United States for breach of contract.
C. Formalities
Florida Statutes section 689.01 has generally been interpreted
to require subscribing witnesses to a contract for the sale of home-
stead property, as a prerequisite for specific performance of that
contract.'" Thus, in Shedd v. Luke,'" where the property involved
was the vendor's homestead property at the time they entered into
an unwitnessed written contract by which they agreed to sell the
property to defendants, the contract of sale was voidable. The pur-
chasers, however, were given possession of the property and began
making monthly payments.
The vendors then brought an action of ejectment alleging that
the contract between the parties was void for want of two subscrib-
ing witnesses, and therefore, they were entitled to possession of the
property. The court's decision denying the right to ejectment was
18. 294 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
19. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1973); Petersen v. Brotmon, 100 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
20. 299 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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fathered by cases in which specific performance2 of a contract to sell
realty was sought under the same circumstances. However, the
question of the right to ejectment was one of first impression. The
court held that the contract was voidable rather than void and that
the vendors, by their subsequent actions, i.e., abandoning the
homestead, turning possession over to the purchaser, and accepting
the monthly installment payments, had cured the defect in the
contract by ratifying it. Thus, at the time the contract was ratified,
the property was no longer the vendors' homestead property and the
contract did not have to comply with the statute.
D. Reformation, Rescission and Abandonment
1. REFORMATION
In Qister v. Paskow,2 an agreement to purchase an apartment
building, with the intention of converting it into a condominium
apartment building, was the subject of the dispute. Because the
necessary financing could not be obtained to close the purchase,
appellee was forced to sell his interest in the contract to appellant.
The agreement provided for a payment to appellee for every unit
sold by appellant if the property was converted into a condominium.
Because appellant determined to sell the units as a cooperative
rather than as a condominium, appellee instituted a suit seeking to
reform the agreement so that he could receive payment for sale of a
cooperative unit rather than a condominium unit.
The court held that since the contract was clear on its face, i.e.
it allowed for payment per unit only if the property was converted
into a condominium, appellee was not entitled to payment for each
cooperative unit sold. The court noted that the result would have
been different and reformation would have been allowed if there had
been a mutual mistake of existing fact.
2. ABANDONMENT
The rule of law concerning abandonment of contracts need*
little elaboration. Suffice it to say that a contract may be aban-
doned by the parties and, once abandoned, may not be specifically
enforced."' However, the problem of what constitutes abandonment
21. See Kozacik v. Kozacik, 157 Fla. 597, 26 So. 2d 659 (1946).
22. 289 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
23. Kuharske v. Lake County Citrus Sales, Inc., 44 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1949).
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has generated a plethora of cases. In Boswell v. Dickinson,4 a con-
tract to purchase certain property called for a specified closing date.
Due to the evasiveness of the attorney who represented both buyer
and seller, no closing was held. The purchasers continuously in-
quired as to when the closing would be. Four or five months later,
the sellers expressed the intention not to close the transaction under
any terms. The buyers filed suit seeking specific performance. The
trial judge denied specific performance of the contract, holding that
the parties had contracted, but that their actions evinced a mutual
desire and intent that the contract be abandoned. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, holding that there was no
evidence showing that the buyers had ever intended to abandon,
rescind, or change the contract. Failure to close at the anticipated
date was not the fault of the buyers, but rather of the attorney;
therefore, the buyers were entitled to specific performance of the
contract.
3. RESCISSION
In Kline v. Devcon Realty Corp.,25 a written deposit receipt
contract to sell land was entered into. There were a series of assign-
ments. Then, after the purchasers made the required down pay-
ment, the vendor refused to deliver the warranty deed conveying his
interest in the property. The purchasers instituted a suit seeking
specific performance of the contract and the vendor counterclaimed
seeking rescission of the contract, alleging fraud and conspiracy on
the part of the brokers, who owned stock in the original corporate
buyer as well as in one of the ultimate assignees.
The court held that because the interests and rights of third
parties, i.e., the assignees, had been affected, rescission could not
be granted because it would be impossible, or at least very difficult,
to return all the parties to their original position. The vendor's
remedy, if any, would have to lie against the real estate brokers.
E. Option Agreements
It is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that in order to
have a contract there must be consideration. Consideration will be
found from any situation in which the promisee derives a benefit,
24. 300 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
25. 285 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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or where the promisor suffers a detriment or inconvenience, however
small, if such is suffered by the consent, express or implied, of the
promisee.
King v. Hall6 involved a purchase option agreement between a
buyer and a seller. Under the terms of the agreement, the buyer was
given a 15 day no penalty option to purchase, during which time the
buyer could decline to purchase the property and have his deposit
reimbursed. The buyer delivered his deposit to the seller's agent.
Within the alloted time period, the seller was informed that the
buyer was exercising his option to purchase. A dispute then arose
when the seller decided that he did not wish to honor the contract
because he was considering a possible trade of land with a third
party. The buyer instituted proceedings seeking specific perform-
ance of the contract.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller
on the grounds that the agreement was an option without considera-
tion, that the buyer's deposit was only a good faith token since it
remained within his discretionary control, and that the rescission of
the option was timely made by the sellers. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, reversed and remanded, holding that al-
though the buyer's deposit could have been withdrawn within the
time period allotted by the option, it did indeed constitute sufficient
consideration to support the agreement as it was a detriment or
inconvenience to the buyer to post it, because the buyer was de-
prived of the use of the money during the period it was posted. The
court also held that the sellers were bound by the terms of the
agreement under which they did not have the privilege of rescission.
Therefore, the buyer was entitled to specific performance of the
agreement.
In Krantz v. Donner,27 a purchaser brought suit for specific
performance of option contracts to convey real property. The pur-
chaser alleged that the property which was the subject matter of the
options, was fraudulently conveyed by the original seller to a third
party, and that the conveyance was made to avoid liability under
the option contract.
The court said that the general rule is that specific performance
of a contract for sale and conveyance of realty will not lie when the
seller is unable to comply because of his own act in conveying the
26. 306 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
27. 285 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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property to a bona fide third party. However, where the third party
purchaser is fully aware that the vendor had previously granted an
option on the property to another, the contract between the vendor
and the third party will be deemed fraudulent and specific perform-
ance of the option agreement will be decreed. The court reversed the
entry of summary judgment because whether there was a bona fide
conveyance to a third party purchaser presented a material question
of fact.
F. Damages
In C. 0. Condominiums, Inc. v. Dickinson,28 a purchaser filed
suit alleging the execution of two deposit receipt contracts whereby
the seller agreed to sell to the purchaser two condominium apart-
ments. Each contract acknowledged receipt of a deposit from the
purchaser and provided that the balance of the down payment in
each case was due and payable at a certain time and that the re-
mainder was payable upon completion of the building. The contract
further specified that the seller might, at his option, retain the
amount of the "binder" paid upon execution as liquidated damages.
The purchaser paid the binder and the balance of the down
payments. When the rest of the purchase price was due, the pur-
chaser refused to accept title to the apartment. The seller refused
to honor the purchaser's demand to return all monies previously
paid with the exception of the binder. The purchaser filed suit to
regain these monies.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that, by the
explicit terms of the contract, it could not be suggested that the
parties intended the balance of the down payment to be forfeited
upon the purchaser's default. The language of the contract allowed
the seller, at its option, to retain only the binder as liquidated dam-
ages. Because the seller resold the units for a substantially higher
price, and because there was no evidence that the seller had suffered
any loss because of the purchaser's default, the seller was entitled
merely to keep the two binders that the purchaser had previously
given. The court stated, however, that the purchaser was getting his
money back not because he was entitled to any special considera-
tion, but only because the seller had not been harmed by the pur-
chaser's default.
28. 301 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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IV. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. Dower
In In re Estate of Cardini,29 the deceased and another purchased
a certain parcel of real property. Thereafter, by warranty deed, all
interest was conveyed to the decedent whose wife contributed a
small sum towards the purchase price. Two days before his death,
the decedent and his wife had executed a deposit receipt contract
agreeing to sell the property. The wife alleged that, by virtue of this
agreement, the decedent intended to create a tenancy by the en-
tirety in the proceeds of the sale of the property. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that the wife was not entitled to the
entire proceeds because the deceased had held title to the real prop-
erty in his name alone. However, the court did hold that the doc-
trine of equitable conversion was applicable to the interest created
by the proceeds of the sale of the property. Thus, the widow could
elect dower in the personalty. This was the case even though the
widow had signed a deposit receipt contract along with her husband,
because, to relinquish her dower, she would have had to have ex-
pressed this in a "clear and unequivocable" manner.
B. Concurrent Estates
In Morton v. Morton,3" several parties entered into a contract
whereby one party, as trustee, owned a one-third interest in the
property. The balance of the property was divided among the oth-
ers. According to the terms of the written contract, the trustee was
to supervise the building of apartments on the property. The trustee
brought an action seeking a mandatory injunction, as well as a
declaratory judgment, to have certain checks that he had signed
honored. The problem presented was whether the trustee's right to
receive the additional profits, over and above that to which his one-
third ownership interest would entitle him, was intended to con-
tinue in effect after such time as he might no longer be supervising
the operation of the property.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
contract conferred only a right to an extra interest in the profits, if
any, as they should accrue. However, the court did hold that the
29. 305 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
30. 307 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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contract presented a latent ambiquity because either of two results
could follow in the event of termination of supervisory services. As
a result, summary judgment was precluded.
C. Adverse Possession
One who claims property by adverse possession has the burden
of overcoming the presumption that he entered into possession of
the realty subordinate to the interest of the legal title holder. In
Meyer v. Law,' A, relying upon an incorrect survey, built and main-
tained a fence for 25 years, enclosing a portion of B's land, in the
belief that it was part of A's own land. Both parties had deeds of
record reflecting the true boundary and both paid taxes only on
their respective properties as shown by such record titles.
On certiorari, the supreme court held that a person who claims
land adversely under a paper title relating to a certain area, and who
fences in or cultivates an area beyond that which is described in the
paper title, but does not pay any taxes on the additional area, can
secure good title by adverse possession only to the portion of land
described by the deed or other written instrument of record. The
court noted that little imagination is required to realize that one
who holds an uncertain or doubtful title, by deed or other recorded
written instrument, to a large piece of property which may likely be
claimed by others, might wisely fence, cultivate, or pay taxes on a
portion of the same, in order to avoid any later controversy. In
recognizing that the concept of adverse possession might be an out-
dated one, the court stated that since today we are faced
with problems of unchecked over-development, depletion of pre-
cious natural resources, and pollution of our environment, the
policy reasons that once supported the idea of adverse possession
may well be succumbing to new priorities. A man who owns some
virgin land, who refrains from despoiling that land, even to the
extent of erecting a fence to mark its boundaries, and makes no
greater use of that land than an occasional rejuvenating walk in
the woods, can hardly be faulted in today's increasingly "mod-
ern" world. Public policy and stability of our society, therefore,
requires strict compliance with the appropriate statutes by those
seeking ownership through adverse possession."
31. 287 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1973).
32. Id. at 41.
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A, not having demonstrated sufficient compliance with the require-
ments of the law, did not perfect his claim by adverse possession.
D. Easements and Prescriptive Rights
An easement has been defined as an incorporeal privilege which
the dominant owner has the right to enjoy in respect to his tenement
in and over that of another, and whereby the owner of the servient
tenement is obliged to suffer or refrain from doing something on his
land to the advantage of the owner of the privilege. In City of Day-
tona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,33 one party owned waterfront prop-
erty upon which he operated an ocean pier as a tourist attraction.
The tract of land upon which the pier was located was an area of
dry sand. On a small portion of the piece of land to which the
landowner held record title, he built an observation tower which
became an integral part of the pier and which could only be entered
from the pier. The owner of another observation tower nearby
brought an action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
to prevent the erection of the public observation tower after work
on the tower had begun. He alleged that by continuous use of the
property for more than 20 years the public had acquired an exclusive
prescriptive right to the use of the land upon which the tower was
being built. Summary judgment was entered directing the removal
of the observation tower within a specified time period. The decision
was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, First District.
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the
decision of the First District and remanded the cause. Cognizant of
the possibility of public acquisition of an easement in the beaches
of the state by prescriptive right, the supreme court said that in
order for a use to ripen into an easement, the use must be exclusive
and inconsistent with the rights of the owner of the land; if not, the
use would be permissive rather than adverse, and therefore an ease-
ment could not be acquired. The court reasoned that visitors, in-
cluding those who had relaxed on the sand of the land owner, were
the "lifeblood" of the pier. As such, they were always welcomed to
utilize the unused sands of his oceanfront parcel of land. Because
the public could obtain an easement only if the owner of the land
"loses something," no easement by prescription was created be-
cause the use of the property by the public was not against, but in
33. 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1973).
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furtherance of, the interests of the land owner. Therefore, the use
was not injurious to him and there was no invasion of his right to
the property. The court further held that even if the public had
acquired an easement by prescription, the property owner could still
make any use of the land consistent with the exercise of the ease-
ment by the public. His erection of the observation tower was con-
sistent with the recreational use of the land by the public.
The beaches of Florida are of such a character as to use and
potential development as to require separate consideration from
other lands with respect to the elements and consequences of
title. The sandy portion of the beaches are of no use for farming,
grazing, timber production, or residency-the traditional uses of
land-but has served as a thoroughfare and haven for fishermen
and bathers, as well as a place of recreation for the public. The
interests and rights of the public to full use of the beaches should
be protected. 4
However, this right of customary use of the dry sand area of beaches
by the public does not create any interest in the land itself. The
dissent argued that if the property owner's building was permitted
to stand, then he might decide to construct larger and more gro-
tesque buildings; and if this situation was multipled by other land-
owners who could do the same, a concrete wall would form, cutting
the public off from any view of the ocean. According to the dissent-
ing judges, the public had acquired prescriptive rights in the prop-
erty owner's land and therefore he should be required to remove his
encroaching observation tower.
In 1975, the Florida legislature provided that certain rights of
entry or easements, given or reserved in any conveyance of realty for
the purpose of mining, drilling or exploring, are rights and interests
in land which may be extinguished by a marketable record title.
Previously, such rights were limited to a 10 year period.35
E. Licenses
A license in real property is a personal, and ordinarily revoca-
ble, unassignable privilege, conferred either in writing or orally, to
do one or more acts on another's land without possessing any inter-
est therein. It is a mere permit to do something on the land of
34. Id. at 77.
35. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-94, amending FLA. STAT. § 704.05 (1973).
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another and it does not imply an interest in the land.
Jabour v. Toppino,35 involved an agreement entitled "Agree-
ment for Easement." The grantor and grantee were adjoining land-
owners. The controversy arose concerning two parcels of realty
conveyed by grantor to grantee, the "Agreement for Easement"
being executed for only one of the parcels. The purpose of this single
agreement was to delineate the various permitted uses of grantor's
land by the grantee and to place conditions and limitations upon
these uses. The grantee was to avoid the use of the land for parking
and was to refrain from placing ramps or loading platforms on the
land other than those already in existence. The grantee subse-
quently enlarged one of the pre-existing ramps, and the grantor
revoked the rights he had previously granted. Suit was brought to
compel the removal of the unauthorized encroachments and to pre-
vent further interference.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
agreement, despite the language of the parties, did not create an
easement. Because the intention of the parties was to allow the
grantee only permissive rights which were revocable upon violation
of the terms of the agreement, only a license was created. Since the
terms of the agreement were violated, the court held that the gran-
tees no longer had any rights upon or across grantor's land and were
enjoined from use of any rights previously held. Also, the grantees
were required to remove any encroachment they had made upon the
grantor's land.
F. Reversion and Reverters
A deed is generally construed most strongly against the grantor,
and where a deed permits more than one interpretation, the one
most favorable to the grantee should be adopted. In Central &
Southern Florida Flood Control District v. Surrency,7 a property
owner's predecessor in title granted to the district a permanent
easement consisting of a specified number of feet over four different
sections of the property." The deed contained a reverter clause
which provided that if the right-of-way was not actually used by the
district within 3 years from the date of the easement deed, the right-
36. 293 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
37. 302 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
38. The easement was granted on "the northerly 95 feet of the southerly 200 feet of
Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, Township 44 South, Range 33 Ease [sic]." Id. at 489.
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of-way was to automatically revert to the grantor, his heirs or as-
signs. The district constructed a levy within two of the sections of
the property but never constructed any portion of the levy within
the other two sections. The property owner brought suit, alleging
that because the district had failed to construct the levy through the
two remaining sections within 3 years of the date of the easement
deed, the easement on those sections reverted to him. The issue
turned on whether the reverter clause required construction of a levy
through each of the several sections or whether it was a single right-
of-way running across the four sections.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the
reference to the sections was only to give a legal description of where
the easement was to be located, and once a single portion of the
right-of-way was utilized within the 3 year period, the easement
became permanent as to the entire right-of-way described in the
deed. This was a pragmatic determination in view of the rules of
statutory construction mentioned at the beginning of this section,
and because of the general rule that conditions tending to destroy
estates are not favored in the law.
G. Restrictive Covenants
Generally speaking, covenants which restrict the use of land are
not favored. However, restrictive covenants will be enforced if they
are reasonable, are confined to lawful purposes, and are expressed
in clear language. In Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine
Ranches Homeowners, Inc.," B's predecessor in title placed on re-
cord certain restrictions regulating the use of improvements on cer-
tain lots to be sold in a development. A group of individual lot
owners, L, was on notice of the restrictions, including one restriction
which reserved to the developer the right to alter, amend, repeal,
or modify the restrictions at any time.
B then sought to amend the restrictions so as to permit a por-
tion of the property to be used for business as well as residential
purposes. L filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment as to the valid-
ity of the clause reserving to the grantor the right to amend. The
trial court held that B did not have the power to amend the restric-
tions because there were circumstances that rendered their enforce-
39. 303 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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ment inequitable, i.e., L's acquisition of the property for residential
purposes.
While noting that there was an inherent inconsistency between
an elaborate set of restrictive covenants, designed to provide for a
general scheme of development for the benefit of the respective
grantees, and a clause wherein the grantor reserved the power, at
any time and in its sole discretion, to change or even arbitrarily
abandon such general scheme of development, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, reversed. The court remedied the apparent
inconsistency by reading into the reservation clause a requirement
of reasonableness. Thus, B had the aforementioned powers over the
restrictions as long as he exercised them in a reasonable manner so
as not to destroy the general scheme or plan of development.
H. Homestead
In re Estate of McCartney involved a petition by testator's
adult children for determination of homestead status of certain
property devised to them. The Supreme Court of Florida held that
a decedent could devise, absolutely and in fee simple, homestead
property to a surviving spouse in the absence of a minor child, and
he is not restricted to devising a life estate to the spouse with a
vested remainder in his adult children.
During the survey period, the Florida legislature made several
changes in the homestead exemption. The additional exemption for
persons over 65 was extended to ad valorem taxes levied by all local
taxing authorities, and the amount of the exemption provided for
totally and permanently disabled persons was increased.4 The limi-
tation of the application of the exemption to levies for school operat-
ing expenses for property used by hospitals and similar institutions
was removed." The maximum combined exemption claimed under
sections 196.202 and 196.031 was limited to $10,000. 41 In addition, a
trust fund was created so as to generate replacement revenues.
44
40. 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
41. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-264, amending FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3), (4) (1973).
42. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-264, amending FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (1973).
43. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-264.





The Florida legislature made several changes in the Condomi-
nium Act during the 1975 session. Stricter requirements for survey
materials to be filed with the declaration of condominium were
provided for. 5 It was further provided that the required certificate
showing that improvements substantially comply with the descrip-
tion in the declaration be issued by a surveyor, rather than by an
architect, engineer or surveyor. 6
Another amendment provided that bylaws may provide restric-
tions on, or requirements for unit appearance.47 It was further pro-
vided that if the person in control of the association's books denies
access to such books, the party denying access is liable for attorney's
fees in an action for enforcement of the provision allowing for
inspection of the books."
The percentage of the number of units required to be sold before
unit owners are entitled to elect at least a majority of the board of
administration was lowered to 50 percent. 9
Escalation clauses in leases for recreational facilities serving
residential cooperative units or condominiums and in management
contracts for residential cooperatives or condominiums have been
declared void as against public policy by the legislature. 0
B. Statutory Provisions
In Daytona Development Corp. v. Bergquist5' owners of two
units in a condominium brought suit against a developer seeking to
quiet title to an area described in the condominium documents as
the "recreation unit" or "recreation hall." The documents specifi-
cally stated that the recreation unit was not to be construed as a
portion of the common elements,52 but rather was to be separately
titled. Ownership was to pass in accordance with the law governing
the passage of title to condominium property. However, nowhere
45. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-224, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.08(1)(e) (1973).
46. Id.
47. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-224, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.11(3)(b) (1973).
48. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-224, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.12(7) (1973).
49. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-224, amending FLA. STAT. § 711.66(1) (Supp. 1974).
50. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-61, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 711.465, .236.
51. 308 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
52. Those areas in which all unit owners have an undivided share.
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was mention made of assignment of an interest in the common
elements to the "recreation unit" or "recreation hall." The owners
grounded their complaint on the theory that the "recreation unit"
was, in fact, a portion of the common elements of the condominium
because of the developer's failure to assign to this "unit" a percen-
tage or fractional share of the common elements as required by
Florida Statutes section 711.08.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, confronted with
few decisions in this area, turned to the "Condominium Act."5
Section 711.04 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that
each unit has, appurtenant thereto, an undivided share in the com-
mon elements of the condominium. The subsequent section54 pro-
vides that the undivided share in the common elements appurten-
ant to each unit shall not be separated from the unit; that a share
in the common elements cannot be conveyed or encumbered except
together with the units; and that the shares in the common elements
appurtenant to units shall remain undivided and shall not be sub-
jected to action for participation. The court, in reading these sec-
tions in pari materia, held that the inescapable conclusion was that
all condominium units must have an undivided share of the com-
mon elements and that neither can exist apart from the other.
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined section 711.08 of
the Florida Statutes which provides that a declaration must be filed
submitting the property described therein to condominium owner-
ship. The declaration, apart from including a legal description of the
land, a survey and plot plan, identification of each unit, and other
matters, must specify the undivided shares, in the form of percen-
tages or fractions in the common elements which are appurtenant
to each unit. The declaration in the case sub judice, by failing to
assign any interest in the common elements to the recreation
unit, was fatally defective and thus ineffectively designated the
"recreation unit" as a condominium unit subject to private owner-
ship. The court pointed out that since judgment had been ren-
dered by the trial court the Condominium Act had been substan-
tially revised. An amendment55 now provides for the filing of an
amended declaration to correct any scrivener's error which results
in a distribution of the shares in the common elements which does
53. FLA. STAT. § 711.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
54. FLA. STAT. § 711.05 (Supp. 1974).
55. FLA. STAT. § 711.06(3) (Supp. 1974).
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not total 100 percent. However, no contention had been made that
the omission was a scrivener's error, and, therefore, the "recreation
unit" was held not to be a condominium unit.
In Aaronson v. Susi,"6 several purchasers of apartments in a
condominium apartment building filed an action for damages,
under section 711.24(3) of the Florida Statutes, against sellers of the
apartments. The purchasers alleged reasonable reliance on false and
misleading information made by the sellers concerning both the
number of apartments involved, and a certain common area that
had been advertised for use as a recreation room, gymnasium and
sauna. At closing, the purchasers were presented with a letter stat-
ing the fact that an additional apartment was to be included in the
building. The letter failed to mention that the extra apartment was
to replace and eliminate the above described common area. The
trial court dismissed the complaint as failing to state a cause of
action.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed and re-
manded, holding that the purchasers should have been explicitly
told of the loss of the recreation area because this was a substantial
matter. Therefore, the purchasers' complaint should not have been
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
C. Standing
In Rubenstein v. Burleigh House, Inc.," a condominium asso-
ciation filed a complaint against the developer for breach of war-
ranty. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint because of the con-
dominium association's lack of standing. The court held that only
the original owners and purchasers were 15roper parties in interest.
VI. MECHANICS' LIENS
A. General Operation
The Mechanics' Lien Law58 is based on the principle that
everyone who, by virtue of his labor or materials, has contributed
to the preservation or enhancement of the property of another
56. 296 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
57. 305 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
58. FLA. STAT. § 713.01 et seq. (1973).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
acquires a right to compensation. A lien on real property is created
for the purpose of securing priority of payment for the value of work
performed or materials furnished in improving real property. Al-
though the statute seems to give protection only to laborers, con-
tractors, and materialmen, it also secures to the owner of property
a given contract price for a specific improvement on his property if
he is dealing in an arm's-length transaction and as long as he com-
plies in good faith with the provisions of the law.59 Because a me-
chanic's lien is purely statutory, there must be strict compliance
with the provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Law before a lien can
come into existence.
Generally speaking, except where a person contracts for the
improvement of property of his or her spouse, a mechanic's lien
extends only to the right, title, and interest of the person who con-
tracts for the improvement, as such right, title or interest existed
at the commencement of the improvement, or was thereafter ac-
quired. In Robb v. Lott Paving Co.,"0 a general contractor, after
having made certain improvements to real property pursuant to a
contract with the lessee, sought to extend the statutory lien to the
interest of the lessor. The lease agreement provided that "[t]enant
is privileged to enter upon the property as soon as the lease is signed,
but prior to its commencement date, to commence modification and
improvements to the building desired by Tenant."'" It was further
provided that the modification should be in a minimum of a speci-
fied amount. The trial court had concluded that the allegations were
insufficient to show a mandatory requirement to modify or improve
the premises, on the lessee's part, which would permit the lien to
extend to the lessor's interest. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed, holding that taken as true, the allegations were
sufficient to extend the lien to the interest of the lessor.
B. Lienor's Notice
As a prerequisite to perfecting a lien and recording a claim of
lien, all lienors who are not in privity with the owner, except labor-
ers, must serve a notice on the owners setting forth the lienor's name
and address, a description of the real property sufficient for identifi-
59. Id.
60. 289 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
61. Id. at 777.
[Vol. 30:517
REAL PROPERTY
cation, and the nature of the services or materials furnished, or to
be furnished. Service of notice is to be made by actual delivery to
the person to be served, 3 or, if the lienor is a corporation, to an
officer, director, managing agent, or business agent thereof.
In Continental Home Parks, Inc. v. Golden Triangle Asphalt
Paving Co. ," a subcontractor served notice on the owner's reception-
ist, whose duties were to answer the phone and to do a "little book-
keeping." The receptionist was held not to be a "managing agent"
or "business agent" because such terms connote one who acts as a
representative of a corporation and who officially speaks for it in its
local business affairs, i. e., an official as compared to a mere em-
ployee. The subcontractor was not entitled to a mechanic's lien
because the protection afforded by the statute is conditioned upon
strict compliance with the law by the party seeking to avail himself
of it.
C. Perfection of Liens
A contractor, in order to perfect his lien, must, at the time final
payment becomes due, give the owner an affidavit" stating that all
lienors have been paid in full, or stating the name of each lienor who
has not been paid in full and the amount due. However, this proce-
dure is not a prerequisite to a filing of a complaint or lien foreclosure
by one in privity with the owner. Thus, in Smyler v. Katzen," where
the owner contracted directly with the painter whose only obligation
was to render personal services incidental to the improvement, and
the contract was one which under customary business practices ex-
cluded the likelihood that the services of a subcontractor would be
necessary to consummate it, the affidavit was excused.
In Eastland Investment Co. v. J. R. Trueman & Associates,7 a
contractor filed a complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien alleging
that he had entered into an agreement with the owner to manage
and supervise the construction of an office complex. The contractor,
having done substantial work pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment, was directed to discontinue performance due to rising costs.
62. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1973).
63. Id.
64. 291 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
65. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)1 (1973).
66. 289 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
67. 287 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1975).
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Prior to this time, the contractor had entered into preliminary nego-
tiations with potential subcontractors, but did not proceed any fur-
ther. An architectural firm also instituted an action to foreclose a
mechanic's lien against the owner on the grounds that it had fur-
nished contracted professional services for which it had not been
paid. The court held that the necessity of furnishing a sworn state-
ment as a condition precedent to maintaining the mechanic's lien
foreclosure action was obviated because the contractor had pro-
ceeded no further than entering into preliminary negotiations with
the subcontractors. Nor was a sworn statement necessary from the
architectural firm, since it was seeking to recover for its professional
services, and therefore, the firm was not a contractor within the
meaning of the statute.
D. Enforcement of Liens
No mechanic's lien continues for a period longer than 1 year
after the claim of lien has been recorded, unless within that time
an action to enforce the lien is commenced in a court of competent
jurisdiction."8 When the contractor and owner are in privity, thus
dispensing with the necessity of a claim of lien, the period in which
the contractor's suit must be brought begins to run from the date
the last item of labor was performed. 9 The time period can be
shortened by recording a Notice of Contest of Lien in the clerk's
office in substantially the form set forth in the statute. Any lienor,
upon whom such notice is served, who fails to institute a suit to
enforce his lien within 60 days after service, loses his right to such
lien.70
One seeking affirmative relief must have complied strictly with
the provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Law and must rely upon the
correctness of his own position rather than the weakness or flaws in
that of his adversary. Thus, it is no defense to say that the other
party is also guilty of non-compliance with the statute. It should be
noted that, in case of failure to establish a lien, the Mechanics' Lien
Law is cumulative to other existing remedies, and that none of its
provisions bar a lienor from maintaining an action at law on a con-
tract or from establishing an equitable lien. 1
68. FLA. STAT. § 713.22(1) (1973).
69. See Hendry Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 138 Fla. 485, 189 So. 710 (1939).
70. FLA. STAT. § 713.22(2) (1973).




In an action brought to enforce a mechanic's lien, the prevailing
party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his
attorney, to be determined by the court, which is to be taxed as part
of his costs.7" However, the statute does not specifically provide for
attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Therefore, such fees are not al-
lowed. Ultimately, it would appear that the "prevailing party" must
be determined from the factual circumstances on a case by case
basis.
In the case of Flagala Corp. v. Hamm,73 there was a dispute
between the parties as to what the owner ought to pay the contractor
for work. After applying an offset between the parties, the court held
that the contractor was entitled to a lien upon the owner's property.
Here, although the contractor did not recover the full contract price,
he was held to have been the prevailing party and was thus entitled
to a reasonable attorney's fee. The court added that had a sum equal
to the lien awarded been paid by the owner without suit, and had
the present suit been instituted only to recover the remaining
amount claimed under the contract, the contractor would not have
been the "prevailing party."
Sharp v. Herman A. Thomas, Inc.74 concerned the same issue.
The contractor brought an action against the landowner to foreclose
a mechanic's lien for services rendered in construction of a resi-
dence. The landowner counterclaimed for damages alleging that the
contractor performed the construction in a unworkmanlike manner.
The court offset the verdict awarded by the jury to the landowner
against the amount owed to the contractor. Jurisdiction was re-
served to enter judgment in favor of the contractor for assessment
of costs, which includes attorney's fees.
On appeal, the landowner contended that it was error for the
trial judge to have retained jurisdiction to tax costs and reasonable
attorney's fees against her without having reserved jurisdiction as
to the contractor since the landowner had prevailed on her counter-
claim. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
court's reserved jurisdiction to tax costs against the defendant
landowner was not error in that the court combined the claim and
72. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1973).
73. 302 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
74. 294 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d Dist.), appeal dismissed, 297 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1974).
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counterclaim and could consider, as a set-off, the assessment of
costs and attorney's fees against the plaintiff contractor. Therefore,
although one prevails as to his counterclaim in a mechanic's lien
action, it does not necessarily mean that he has prevailed so as to
recover reasonable attorney's fees.
VII. TAXATION
A. Valuation
Assessment of property for ad valorem taxation involves two
distinct acts: the preparation of an assessment roll and the valua-
tion of the property. Notice to a property owner and an opportunity
to be heard at some time during the proceedings is a fundamental
requisite to the validity of an assessment for taxation. However, by
his conduct, the property owner may deprive himself of the right to
be heard.7" Among factors considered in the valuation of property
for tax purposes are: (1) present cash value; (2) the present use, and
the highest and best use to which the property can be expected to
be put in the immediate future; (3) location; (4) size; (5) present
replacement value of any improvement; (6) condition; (7) income;
and, (8) net proceeds of the sale, as received by the seller after
deduction of all of the usual fees and costs of the sale including the
costs and expenses of financing."6
Generally, land used for agricultural purposes will benefit from
a decreased rate of tax. In Firstamerica Development Corp. v.
County of Volusia,77 an owner acquired land primarily for the pur-
pose of subdividing it and marketing it as lots in a land installment
sales promotion. The owner urged that his lands for a certain year
should have been classified and assessed as agricultural lands pur-
suant to section 93.461 of the Florida Statutes." The court would
not accept this contention because on the first day of the year in
question, the land was not being used primarily for bona fide agri-
cultural purposes. The court recognized that an agricultural use
does not necessarily have to be efficient or economically sound in
order to qualify the land for agricultural classification. However, the
court found that although the owner made an agricultural use of the
75. See State ex rel. Hurner v. Culbreath, 140 Fla. 634, 192 So. 814 (1939).
76. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (Supp. 1974).
77. 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1975).
78. This section deals with the classification and assessment of agricultural lands.
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land during the calendar year, it was merely an incidental use.
Therefore, the property in question did not qualify.
In Cassady v. McKinney,7" an owner brought suit challenging
the assessment of his grove lands as being illegal, excessive, and in
violation of the preferential treatment mandated by Florida's
"Green Belt Law."8° The trial court held that the tax assessor had
failed to consider two of the previously mentioned criteria and or-
dered that the property be reassessed to include consideration of
both (1) the depreciated value of the orange trees and (2) the income
produced by the property.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed, hold-
ing that the statutory delineation of the criteria was intended to
limit the assessor's discretion and to tie him more closely to the
uniform constitutional standard of just valuation. It was held that
"present depreciated value" meant the actual current value as dis-
tinguished from original or replacement cost; it did not mean cur-
rent book value after allowance for depreciation.
Under Florida Statutes section 192.042(1),"1 improvements not
substantially completed by January 1 shall have no value placed
thereon. The statute further provides that "substantially com-
pleted" means that the improvement or some self-sufficient unit
within it can be used for the purpose for which it was constructed.
Manufacturers National Corp. v. Blake82 involved an action by
the owner of a condominium development challenging real property
tax assessment for improvements. The court held that even though
individual condominium parcels in the building were not substan-
tially completed, the common elements of the building such as
parking area and ramp, dock and pier area, pool, elevators, roof
structure, plumbing system, and air conditioning system, which
were useable for the purpose for which each was constructed as of
the taxing date, were properly assessed. These elements were held
to be taxable notwithstanding section 711.19 of the Florida Statutes
which provides that each condominium parcel should be separately
assessed for ad valorum taxes.
79. 296 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
80. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(6) (Supp. 1974).
81. This section deals with the date of assessment.
82. 287 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1974).
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B. Exemption
General laws providing tax exemptions must provide criteria
which comply with the constitutional limitation that portions of
property predominantly used for religious or charitable purposes
may be exempted from taxes.8" Presbyterian Homes v. Wood 4 pre-
sented the question whether sections 196.197(1), (2), and (3) of the
Florida Statutes, prescribing criteria which was based primarily on
income for determining ad valorum tax exemption for homes for the
aged, was constitutional and conformed to the limitation on exemp-
tion provision of section 3(a), Article VII, of the Florida Constitu-
tion. The constitution states that such portions of property as are
used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or
charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation.
The statute provides that homes for the aged should be exempt only
if residency was restricted to (a) persons 62 years of age or older
having a gross income of not more than $5,000.00 per year; (b)
couples, one of whom is 62 years of age or older, who have a com-
bined income of not more than $6,000.00 per year; (c) persons totally
and permanently disabled, having a gross income of not more than
$5,000.00 per year; and, (d) disabled couples with combined in-
comes of not more than $6,000.00 per year. The circuit court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding the statute
unconstitutional because its criteria failed on its face to conform to
the previously quoted portion of section 3, Article VII. The "income
test" was held to be too narrow in scope to conform to the intent of
the constitutional limitations, because the test gave greater weight
to the personal economics of a resident of an apartment or room in
a home for the aged or disabled, than to the overall purpose of the
home as a religious or charitable institution. The "income test" was
held to be restrictive in that it applied pecuniarily and selectively
to particular individuals and their apartments rather than to the
general objects of a home provided by churches or charitably ori-
ented organizations for their programs. Inasmuch as an "income
test" was the primary determinant of the eligibility for tax exemp-
tion of a home, other factors traditionally used in determining the
status of such a home were minimized. This was contrary to the
83. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a); Halbein v. Hall, 189 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1966).
84. 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974).
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intent of the constitutional limitations.
The court also noted that if the "income test" was used as a
criteria for tax exemption for homes for the aged, serious questions
of equal protection would be raised. A strong case could be made
that it was unequal treatment for the legislature to allow tax exemp-
tions for sorority or fraternity houses, schools, churches, nursing
homes, hospitals, fraternal organizations, veterans' groups, etc.,
when none have coupled with it an appreciable indigency or pecuni-
ary status restriction as a condition precedent to allowance of tax
exemption in contrast to the statutory test for the charitable or
religious housing. Inasmuch as the chapter governing exemptions of
charitable or religious property from taxation contained other cri-
teria to be used in determining tax exemption of religious or charita-
ble homes for the aged, the unconstitutional provision of an "income
test" as a criteria for tax exemption of homes for aged could be
excised from the chapter.
The Supreme Court of Florida held, in Horne v. Markham,85
that a constitutional provision for homestead exemption from taxa-
tion does not establish an absolute right to the exemption. A prere-
quisite for a homestead exemption is that constitutional require-
ments must be followed. A homeowner who fails to make timely
application for a homestead exemption cannot be heard to complain
of the denial of the constitutional right to a homestead exemption.
In the case of Walden v. University of Tampa, Inc.," the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a statute" which
provided that no action should be brought to contest tax assessment
after 60 days from the date that the assessment roll was certified for
collection, did not apply to an assessment that was void because
made on exempt property. Nevertheless, ad valorum taxes paid on
exempt property were governed by the statute relating to limita-
tions of claims against counties, and thus could not be refunded in
a suit brought more than one year after their payment.
At this point, it is noteworthy to discuss a recent amendment
to section 193.011(2) of the Florida Statutes. The amendment states
that in the event a moratorium is imposed by law, ordinance, regu-
lation, resolution, proclamation, or motion adopted by any govern-
mental body or agency which prohibits, restricts, or impairs the
85. 288 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1973).
86. 304 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 315 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1975).
87. FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (Supp. 1974).
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ability of a taxpayer to improve or develop his property to its highest
and best use as otherwise authorized by applicable law, regulation,
or ordinance, the assessor is to consider such moratorium in deter-
mining his assessment. The taxpayer may petition the Board of Tax
Adjustment for relief, and his assessment may be adjusted in order
to reflect the restrictions imposed by the moratorium. The authors
would like to pose the question of whether, by analogy, this amend-
ment could be extended to cover a case of inverse condemnation
whereby the State has not prohibited a landowner from making any
use of his land, but has inordinately delayed him in effecting a sale.
Whether the landowner should be compelled to pay taxes on a piece
of property that he can no longer use is a question which has never
been decided by the Florida courts.
VIII. ZONING
A. Procedure
The right to devote real estate to any legitimate use is a right
protected by the Florida Constitution. The only basis upon which a
landowner's right to the unfettered use of his land must yield is the
necessity to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare.
Zoning laws are the product of ever-increasing complex problems
that affect urban life. Their purpose is to regulate, systematize, and
stabilize the growth of cities and towns and thus promote general
order, covenience, health, and beauty. However, the zoning power
is justified only as an exercise of the general police power. In Miller
v. MacGill,8 the court held that the desire of an overwhelming
number of property owners to keep a proposed convenience store out
of their area because they felt that a commercial establishment
would interfere with the quality of living in the residential area was
not a legally sufficient reason to deprive the would-be storeowner of
the lawful use of his property.
The determination of uses for which property should be rezoned
is a matter for consideration and legislative action by the county
commission. In Metropolitan Dade County v. McGeary,89 it was
held that a circuit court had no power to rezone property to devise
a more liberal classification because the doctrine of separation of
powers would be violated. The court held that the classification of
88. 297 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1975).
89. 291 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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lands under zoning ordinances required the exercise of legislative
power.
In Orange County v. City of Apoka, ° municipalities filed suit
for a declaratory judgment. They alleged that they were entitled to
use the land owned by them, but located outside their boundaries,
for the construction of an airport without obtaining approval for the
proposed use from the county where the lands were located. The
circuit court entered judgment in favor of the municipality, holding
that, in using the land for airport purposes, the municipalities were
not subject to the zoning regulations of the county.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed and
remanded. The court recognized the general rule that a governmen-
tal body is not subject to zoning restrictions where property is to be
used for governmental, as opposed 'to proprietary purposes. The
court, held however, that this rule was inapplicable to the situation
in which a governmental unit wishes to use property which it owns
in another jurisdiction, contrary to the zoning regulations of that
jurisdiction. There, the proper test would be the balancing of com-
peting interests.
The exigencies of the present matter, however, illustrate the core
of wisdom in that general rule and the danger in too readily
assuming enlightenment where none in fact may exist in the im-
plementation of a particular local zoning policy. Therefore, we
adopt a balancing-of-public-interests test for the resolution of
conflicts which arise between the exercise by governmental agen-
cies of their police power and their right of eminent domain. This
is preferable to adherence to a less flexible 'general rule' based
simply on the form of the opposing parties rather than the sub-
stance of their conflict.9
In conclusion, the court held that one governmental unit must be
bound by the zoning regulations of another governmental unit in the
absence of specific legislative authority to the contrary.
B. Validity
Zoning ordinances present mixed questions of law and social
economics. As a legitimate exercise of the state's police power in
90. 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
91. Id. at 656, quoting Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 471, 197
N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
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furtherance of the public welfare, regulations must be made in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan, reasonably considering the
character of the area and its suitability for particular purposes. The
general rule is that a zoning ordinance must prescribe definite stan-
dards and must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what conduct is forbidden thereunder. Zoning ordinances will be
upheld unless it is clearly shown that they are merely an arbitrary
exercise of power without a relation to public health, morals, safety,
or welfare.2
In City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 3 a zoning ordinance prohib-
ited the keeping or parking of camper vehicles on private property
within the city, except if enclosed within the confines of a garage.
The court noted that although there could be some doubt as to
whether certain vehicles were covered by the ordinance, there was
no question that in the case sub judice the vehicle in question was
prohibited by the ordinance. Also, the court held that the zoning
ordinance, aimed at preventing the unsightly appearances and
diminution of property values that occurred when camper-type ve-
hicles were parked or stored out-of-doors in residential areas of a
community, was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Storage of the vehi-
cles was permitted within a garage or other structure, and therefore
the ordinance did not unconstitutionally deprive the owners of a
right to have camper-type vehicles.
C. Nonconforming Uses and Exceptions
A nonconforming use is the use of a building or particular land
which does not follow the zoning regulations of the use district in
which it is situated. Usually a nonconforming use will be allowed
to continue subject to certain conditions. In the case of City of
Miami Beach v. Arlen King Cole Condominium Association,4 the
city instituted an action to enforce a zoning ordinance. The court
held that where an apartment-hotel, which was a nonconforming
use because of its insufficient off-street parking, was changed to a
condominium, and little structural change was made, such change
in the form of ownership did not result in an abandonment of the
nonconforming use. This is so because the use relates to the property
92. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93. 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
94. 302 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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and not to the type of ownership of the property. In the instant case
there was no significant change in the real property or in the im-
provements thereon. Therefore, the nonconforming use could be
continued.
The governing board of a municipality may provide that the
board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and subject to appro-
priate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the
terms of an ordinance if those exceptions are in harmony with the
general purpose of the ordinance. The case of City of Naples v.
Central Plaza of Naples, Inc.95 involved an action for declaratory
relief and a mandatory injunction. B was the owner of an essentially
square piece of property upon which he desired to build multifamily
residences. B's entire property was zoned for industrial purposes,
but the ordinance provided that a special exception might be per-
mitted. B's petition for special exception was denied. The trial court
found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious. On appeal the court
held that the city council, when considering a petition for a special
exception, did not have the right to consider evidence that inordi-
nate demands would be made on the utilities and other public serv-
ices where the applicable ordinance did not refer to the effect upon
the ability of the city to furnish such utilities and other supporting
services.
D. Legislation
The Florida legislature has passed the Local Government Com-
prehensive Planning Act of 1975.96 This Act requires counties, mu-
nicipalities, and certain other units of local government to prepare
and adopt comprehensive plans to guide future development. Local
planning agencies are provided for to prepare and recommend com-
prehensive plans to the governing bodies. The required and the
optional elements of a comprehensive plan are listed. Chief among
these are the requirements that the elements be consistent; and that
the economic assumption upon which the plan is based, the rela-
tionship of the proposed development to the comprehensive plans
of adjacent municipalities and the state, and the policy recommen-
dations be given. Also required is a future land use plan element, a
traffic circulation element, a general sanitary sewer, solid waste and
95. 303 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
96. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-257.
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drainage element, a conservation element, a recreation and open
space element, a housing element, and an intergovernmental coordi-
nation element. Further requirements are added if the local govern-
mental unit is in a coastal zone.
Optional elements are also listed, and are mandatory if over
50,000 people live in the municipality. These include mass transit,
air and water port, off-street parking, safety, economic, historical,
and general area redevelopment elements.
Also in 1975, the legislature included federal standards within
the definition of "airport hazard," and provided for the requirement
of a permit to build structures exceeding federal obstruction stan-
dards. 7 In addition, political subdivisions are now required to adopt
airport zoning regulations. 8
IX. WATER LAW
A. Pollution
As a general rule, the owner of land borders on a surface stream
of water flowing in a well defined channel has the right to receive
the water of the stream in a condition uncorrupted in quality.9 In
the case of Harrell v. Hess Oil and Chemical Corp.,00 the Supreme
Court of Florida noted that where a landowner's common law ri-
parian rights were violated by the acts of another individual, he was
not limited to seeking relief from public authorities. He could bring
an action on his own behalf. Any other result would place the ri-
parian rights of the landowner at the mercy of public officials who
might not have the same degree of interest in his rights, and would
also forbid him to challenge a deprivation of his property rights in
court.
B. Accretions
The general rule is that when lands are patented according to
an official survey showing meander lines along a body of water, any
excess land is apportioned to the patentee; and his title is extended
97. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-16, amending FLA. STAT. § 333.01(3) (1973), and creating §
333.025.
98. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 76-16 amending FIA. STAT. § 333.03 (1973).
99. Board of Trustees v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1973).
100. 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973).
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to the water's edge in accordance with the surveyor's intent in mak-
ing the shoreline one of the calls of the description.'"' In the case of
United States v. 295.90 Acres of Land,12 an eminent domain pro-
ceeding was instituted by the government to acquire certain lands
to be used as a national wildlife refuge. The controversy arose when
attempts were made to apply an old survey containing a meander
line to a particular portion of the land as it now exists. A new survey
was taken, and it was ascertained that upland existed where water
bottom was shown on the previous survey (areas lying beyond the
earlier survey's meander line), and the new survey allocated this
land as apparent accretion, giving one-half to the southern owner
of the piece of land and the other one-half to the northern owner.
The government contended that it was entitled to this extra
parcel of land because the case fell within the exception to the
aforementioned rule that where a meander line is shown to be a
gross error tantamount to fraud because no water ever existed at or
near the place indicated, then any land beyond the meander line is
to be treated as unsurveyed land, title to which remains in the
government. The complainants contended that this case did not fall
within the exception to the rule, and, that if the government was
going to condemn the land, they should be entitled to compensa-
tion. The court, in a rather lengthy discussion, held that in order to
decide which contention they should accept, there were three factors
to be considered. The first determinant was that of the size of the
parcel involved. In considering the size, three elements had to be
given consideration: (1) the size or area of the parcel as shown by
the original survey; (2) the relative size of the "new area" disclosed
by the more recent survey; and, (3) the size or magnitude of the
original surveyor's error measured by the amount of unsurveyed
land in the surrounding vicinity as a whole. A second factor was the
intent of the original surveyor, i.e., whether he intended to meander
an existing body of water, or whether he wrongfully excluded good
land. The third factor weighed was the nature and value of the land
in relation to the other conditions surrounding the making of the
disputed survey. After considering these factors, the court con-
cluded that because the lands were of such little value, the locality
101. Producers Oil Co. v. Hanzen, 238 U.S. 325 (1915); Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406
(1891).
102. 368 F. Supp. 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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so wild and remote, and the attendant difficulties in conducting a
survey so great, the failure to run the lines with more particularity
in the original survey was not unreasonable. The court held for the
riparian landowners, stating that the general rule concerning lands
which are patented according to an official survey could be applied
in the absence of proof that a clearly defined body of water ever
existed.
The exception to the rule, after all, is just that-an exception.
Strong policy considerations are aligned against its application
except in the most egregious circumstances. Century old surveys
are bound to be inaccurate in some respects, and ". . . the im-
mense importance of stability of titles dependent upon
[Government patents] demand that suit to cancel them should
be sustained only by proof which produces conviction."'' 3
In evaluating the import of its decision, the court cautioned that any
reference on a plat to a body of water would not mean that as a
matter of law the water was the boundary.
C. Legislation
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act has recently been
amended. The Act now provides that the local sponsor of beach
erosion control projects shall assume responsibility for costs in ex-
cess of state and federal cost limitations.' 4 The amendment further
authorizes the Department of Natural Resources to pay up to 75
percent of the nonfederal construction and maintenance costs.' 5
Also, the list of projects previously enacted was replaced by a re-
quirement that the Department maintain a current project listing.'0
The Florida legislature recently passed the Florida Aquatic Pre-
serve Act of 1975. "' This Act provides for the creation of 31 aquatic
preserves. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund is required to maintain the preserves, in which, with a few
exceptions, it is prohibited to dredge, fill, drill for gas or oil wells,
excavate minerals, or erect structures. The Act also provides for the
creation of additional preserves.
103. Id. at 1310-11.
104. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-288, amending FLA. STAT. § 161.091(1) (Supp. 1974).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-172, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 258.35-44.
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The Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974' °" was also enacted
during the survey period. This Act provides for a continuous and
comprehensive program of coastal boundary mapping, the intent of
which is to provide for accurate surveys.
X. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Legislation
Very little decisional law has derived from litigation under the
Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.'"9 The Act does at-
tempt to equalize the relatively unequal bargaining positions of the
tenant and the landlord. An in-depth discussion of the various sta-
tutory provisions is presented elsewhere."" A few changes are pre-
sented here.
During the 1974 session, the Florida legislature amended the
Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act so as to require 7 days'
notice by the tenant to the landlord prior to vacating or abandoning
the premises when the tenant is leaving prior to the expiration of
the term specified in a written lease."' Failure to give such notice
relieves the landlord of his duty to give notice to the tenant concern-
ing advance rent or a security deposit."'
Further amendments came out of the 1975 session. The land-
lord is now required to notify the tenant of where and how any
advanced rent or security deposit is being held."3 Such notice must
include a copy of the provisions of section 83.49(3), Florida Statutes,
related to returning or imposing a claim upon a security deposit.,
It was further provided, however, that failure to provide this notice
will not be a defense to the payment of rent when due."5
A subsection was added to section 83.49 to provide that security
deposits carried forward upon the renewai of an existing lease are
to be considered "new security deposits."'"'
108. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 75-56, creating FLA. STAT. § 832.07.
109. FLA. STAT. § 83.001 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
110. Comment, Up from Feudalism -Florida's New Residential Leasing Act, 28 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 115 (1973).
111. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-93, creating FLA. STAT. § 83.49(5).
112. Id.
113. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-133, amending FLA. STAT. § 83.49(2) (1973).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-133, creating FLA. STAT. § 83.49(6).
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Certain public lodging and food establishments licensed by the
Division of Hotels and Restaurants of the Department of Business
Regulation may now be subjected to a fine or revocation or suspen-
sion of a license for failure to comply with the provisions relating to
the rights and duties of landlords and tenants."7
The legislature has also provided that in an action by a landlord
for possession of a dwelling unit based upon nonpayment of rent, the
court shall, in addition to awarding possession to the landlord, di-
rect a money judgment within its jurisdictional limitations in favor
of the landlord for any amount found to be due and owing."'
Additionally, the Department of Legal Affairs was given con-
current jurisdiction with state attorneys in seeking injunctions
against violations of laws by mobile home dwellers, owners, or oper-
ators of mobile home parks."'
B. Exculpatory Clauses
The new Landlord and Tenant Act voids and renders unen-
forceable any provision in a rental agreement which purports to
limit or preclude any liability on the part of the landlord to the
tenant, and vice versa.'"0 The court in Fuentes v. Owen' held that
the provision could not be applied to a case where the lease was
executed before the effective date of the Act and where the actions
complained of by the tenant also occurred before its effective date.
However, the court went on to hold that, in order for the instant
exculpatory clause to be upheld, its wording would have to be so
clear and understandable that the ordinary and knowledgeable
party would know what he was contracting away, and that under
no circumstances could an exculpatory clause relieve a landlord or
his agent from liability for an intentional tort. This is understanda-
ble in view of the general disfavor with which such clauses are
looked upon. In the case sub judice, where the landlord's manager
grabbed and beat a tenant who was about to quit the premises due
to an infestation of worms, the exculpatory clause was held to be of
no avail to the landlord.
117. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-133, creating FLA. STAT. § 83.49(7).
118. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-147, creating FLA. STAT. § 83.625.
119. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-147, amending FLA. STAT. § 83.73 (1973).
120. FLA. STAT. § 83.47 (1973).
121. 310 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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The case of Rubin v. Randwest Corp.,' dealing with another
lease effective before the date of the new Act, reached the same
result as to the effectiveness of an exculpatory clause. The dissent-
ing judge, however, stated that regardless of whether the new act
was applicable, a lease relieving one of liability should be declared
null and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. He further went
on to add that an exculpatory clause's validity "should not be predi-
cated upon what the legislature may pronounce during a particular
legislative session."'' 3 He urged that the court could make a deter-
mination similar to that found in the statute in the exercise of its
judicial function, because the new act did not forbid or otherwise
preclude it from so doing. In discarding the view that an exculpatory
clause should be upheld because to do so would be consistent with
the "weight of authority," he stated:
It seems to me that it is a violation of the living spirit of the law
to adhere to an ancient rule which has no pragmatic application
to realities of today. A precedent, in law, in order to be binding,
should appeal to logic and a genuine sense of justice. What lends
dignity to the law founded on precedent is that, if analyzed, the
particularly cited case wields authority by the sheer force of its
self-integrated honesty, integrity and rationale. A precedent can
not, and should not, control, if its strength depends alone on the
fact that it is old, but may crumble at the slightest probing touch
of instinctive reason and natural justice."4
C. Mobile Homes
The statutory provisions"' on mobile home parks establish the
classification of mobile home park owners. This distinguishes them
from other landlords. The statute's constitutionality was attacked
for that reason in the case of Stewart v. Green.'26 The Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police
power because the business of running a mobile park home is inher-
ently distinguishable from one involving an apartment building;
thus, there was a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the
act and the class included. Mobile park homeowners are landlords
122. 292 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1974).
123. Id at 62 (dissenting opinion).
124. Id. quoting Boseley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 183, 142 A. 2d 263, 274 (1958).
125. FLA. STAT. § 83.69 et seq. (1973).
126. 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1974).
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in a general sense. Tenants rent from them only that small area of
land on which their mobile home will fit, since the home itself is
privately owned by the tenant.
The court held that mobile home owners had special interests
and necessities different from their apartment-renting counterparts.
Upon eviction, a tenant in an apartment building merely has his
personal possessions to move, while the mobile home tenant has
added expenses and problems in having the mobile home itself to
transport. Also, mobile home tenants require further protection
from park owners, who, in trying to obtain many newer sales of
mobile homes without sufficient land on which to locate them, may
use eviction as a means of making future sales. The statute, whose
purpose was to ameliorate the evils inimical to public welfare in the
area of mobile home park rentals, has afforded the extra protection
needed by mobile home tenants by providing specific grounds for
eviction. Thus, the statute was found to be rational and non-
discriminatory, as the mobile home park enterprise affects public
interest and bears a substantial relationship to public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.
D. Damages
Catalina, Inc. v. Biscayne Northeast Corp.,127 involved a lease
agreement wherein the tenant was permitted to sublet only with the
landlord's consent which was not to be unreasonably withheld. The
tenant moved out of the leased premises before the expiration of the
term. Before doing so, he tendered a sublease to a person already a
tenant of the landlord at a higher rent. The landlord rejected the
sublease, and then, having rented the premises at a higher rate,
brought suit against the tenant for the rent due under the balance
of the term of the lease. The tenant counterclaimed for his loss of
profit (the difference between the lease rent and the tendered sub-
lease rent). The landlord urged that he should not be required to
approve a sublease to a prospective tenant who was already an
existing tenant of his. The court held that this contention would
only have validity if the proposed sublease would have destroyed or
adversely affected a lease already in existence, but the sublease in
the instant case was only for additional space. Therefore, the ten-
127. 296 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d Dist.); cert. denied, 306 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1974).
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ants were entitled to recover the difference between the lease rent
and the tendered sublease rent.
In Conner v. Atlas Aircraft Corp.,'8 a tenant brought an action
to recover for a wanton and wilful breach of an oral lease. The tenant
was evicted from leased warehouse premises in which he had an
ongoing business. The court held that when a tenant has been
wrongfully evicted by his landlord, he may recover general damages.
In addition, he may also recover compensation for any loss resulting
from injury to his business, including loss of profits. However, lost
profits of an established business are recoverable only if the loss is
the natural result of the wrong and if the amount can be established
with reasonable certainty.
A similar problem was presented by Ed Skoda Ford, Inc. v. P
& P Paint & Body Shop, Inc."' where the court held that loss of
profits could be recovered only when they could be ascertained with
reasonable certainty. A lessee's damages should not be based on an
amount lost or projected to be lost for 3 years following termination
of a lease.
E. Rent
The case of City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.' 31 upheld
the constitutionality of a statute' 3' authorizing the city to enact a
rent control ordinance. The court held that "rent control," under
appropriate circumstances, clearly fell within the general category
of "municipal purposes" if sufficient justifying conditions were
given.
However, the court held the provisions of the rent control ordi-
nance under consideration to be invalid because it did not rationally
attempt to relieve the critical shortage of residential housing.
The purpose of rent control legislation has always been to stabi-
lize rentals in emergency areas and under emergency conditions
so as to prevent extortionate increases in rent resulting from
housing shortages, and at the same time to allow landlords a fair
and equitable return upon their investments."'
128. 310 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
129. 302 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 315 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1975).
130. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
131. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1973).
132. 305 So. 2d at 768 (Dekle, J., concurring).
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The ordinance was therefore unconstitutional because its provisions
and guidelines were arbitrary and unreasonable.
XI. OTHER NEW LEGISLATION
During the survey period, the legislature enacted provisions
allowing for oil and gas liens.'3 3 Such a lien arises when a person,
under contract with either the interest holder of the land or the
operator, provides any labor or provides any materials or service
used or to be used in the drilling of an oil or gas well, or the construc-
tion of any oil or gas pipeline.
The Florida Factory-Built Housing Act of 1971 was amended in
1974.'13 The definitions were changed to reflect the recommenda-
tions of the national conference of states on building codes and
definitions. 3 An addition was made to provide that local govern-
ment regulations may not conflict with the Act, nor discriminate
between factory-built housing and conventionally-built housing.'
36
Also, in an action for injunctive relief, non-compliance with the Act
or the regulation promulgated thereunder was made prima facie
evidence of irreparable damage. 
37
The Real Estate License Law was amended in 1975. Changes
provide that an applicant for registration shall have held anactive
real estate salesman's registration certificate in the office of one or
more registered real estate brokers for at least 12 months during the
preceding 5 years, thereby eliminating the apprenticeship require-
ment.'1 The Law was also amended to allow for the retention of
registration upon becoming a nonresident.' 9 The commission is now
allowed to require that courses be taken at accredited colleges, uni-
versities, community colleges or real estate schools.'4 °
The New Communities Act of 1975's' is now the sole authority
for establishing new community districts. The procedure for the
creation of a community by petition is set forth in the Act. The Act
133. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-51, creating FiA. STAT. §§ 713.80, 713.82-.93.
134. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-208.
135. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-208, amending FLA. STAT. § 553.36 (1973).
136. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-208, amending FLA. STAT. § 553.38 (1973).
137. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-208, amending FLA. STAT. § 553.39 (1973).
138. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-106, amending FLA. STAT. § 475.17(3) (1973).
139. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-112, amending FLA. STAT. § 475.14 (1973).
140. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-117, amending FLA. STAT. § 475.17(4) (1973).
141. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-204, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 163.601-.604, 163.611-613,
163.621-.624, 163.631-.632.
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provides for the type of governing body along with its given powers.
The legislature enacted the Florida Environmental Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1975 in the survey period."' This Act creates the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation and the Environmental Regula-
tion Commission. The express intent behind this legislation is to
centralize authority and pinpoint responsibility in the field of envi-
ronment regulation. The delegation of substantial decision-making
authority to the district level is also provided for.
142. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-22.
